Soviet documents reveal insights into hazards of fighting in Afghanistan

By The Associated Press

Recently declassified documents from archives in the former Soviet Union and newly translated memoirs of senior Soviet military and political leaders detail the problems of fighting in Afghanistan:

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"The decision was made in the conditions when there was a lot of uncertainty in the balance of forces within the Afghan society. Our picture of the real social and economic situation in the country was also insufficiently clear. We do not want to say it, but we should: At that time, we did not even have a correct assessment of the unique geographical features of that hard-to-enter country. That found its reflection in the operations of our troops against small highly mobile units, where very little could be accomplished with the help of modern military technology.

"In addition, we completely disregarded the most important national and historical factors, above all the fact that the appearance of armed foreigners in Afghanistan was always met with arms in the hands of the population." – May 10, 1988, letter from the Kremlin to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

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"(President Mikhail) Gorbachev proposed making a decision on Afghanistan, meaning that it's time to end it. He described his meeting with (then-Afghan leader Babrak) Karmal. He said Karmal was dumbfounded. He had expected anything but this from us, he was sure we needed Afghanistan even more than he did. He's been counting on us to stay there for a long time – if not forever. That is why Gorbachev had to make himself perfectly clear: By the summer of 1986, you'll have to have figured out how to defend your cause on your own. We'll help you, but with arms only, not troops." – Gorbachev adviser Anatoly Chernyaev's notes from Politburo session of Oct. 17, 1985.

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"The counterrevolution masks itself as if they were civilians, they live among the people. The rebels actively use not only terror, but also propaganda, controlling extensive areas and relying on the old age-proven relations of the tribal and feudal society. Purely military operations aimed at destruction of a certain rebel unit, or a certain stronghold obviously bring no results in the situation where the enemy controls the extensive territory. It is quite clear now that even under the most favorable circumstances, and with the most effective strategy and the tactics, the defeat of the counterrevolutionary formations will take years, most likely no less than five years." – Pravda correspondent I. Shchedrov's letter on Nov. 12, 1981, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the situation in Afghanistan.

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"We should honestly admit that our efforts over the last eight years have not led to the expected results. Huge material resources and considerable casualties did not produce a positive end result – stabilization of military-political situation in the country. The protracted character of the military struggle and the absence of any serious success, which could lead to a breakthrough in the entire strategic situation, led to the formation in the minds of the majority of the population of the mistrust in the abilities of the regime. ... The experience of the past years clearly shows that the Afghan problem cannot be solved by military means only." – Col. K. Tsagolov's Aug. 13, 1987, letter to the Soviet defense minister on the situation in Afghanistan.

AP-WS-10-29-01 0122EST